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Much Ado About Nothing? – Smoking Bans and 
Germany’s Hospitality Industry
Abstract
Over the last years, public smoking bans have been introduced in most European 
countries. Unlike elsewhere, in Germany such bans were introduced at state level at 
diﬀ  erent points in time, which provides important intra-country regional variation 
that can be exploited to identify the eﬀ  ects of such bans on the hospitality industry. 
Using monthly data from a compulsory survey carried out by the German Federal 
Statistical Oﬃ   ce, we study the short-run eﬀ  ects that these bans had on establish-
ments’ sales. In contrast to the largely US-based literature, we ﬁ  nd that smoke-free 
policies had a negative (yet moderate) eﬀ  ect on establishment sales. Closure rates of 
businesses in the hospitality industry, however, were not signiﬁ  cantly aﬀ  ected by the 
introduction of state smoking bans.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: L51; I12
Keywords: smoking bans; sales; intra-country regional variation
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Tobacco consumption represents the single greatest preventable cause of death in
industrialized countries (World Health Organization, 2008). In recent years, most
countries have enacted tobacco control policies to reduce smoking prevalence and
to protect non-smokers against second-hand-smoke. Among these control policies,
public smoking bans are widely considered the key measure for averting health
damage caused by second-hand-smoking. Yet, such bans remain heavily disputed,
particularly in the hospitality industry, as owners of bars, pubs, and restaurants
fear to suffer signiﬁcant losses in their sales and revenues.
Knowledge of the costs of smoking bans to businesses in the hospitality indus-
try is important for public policy. They determine in part the political and public
support that can be amassed for this tobacco control measure. And they are in-
dispensable for an objective assessment of the overall net economic effects of this
instrument. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that the costs of smoking bans may
be more important in such an assessment than long thought, as the main beneﬁt of
smoking bans, that is a reduction in the overall exposure of non-smokers to passive
smoking, may be signiﬁcantly smaller than hitherto assumed (Adda and Cornaglia,
2006).1
The effects of smoking bans on businesses in the hospitality industry have been
studied extensively; see Goel and Nelson (2006) and in particular Scollo and Lal
(2008) for the most comprehensive literature reviews to date. Most studies do not
ﬁnd any evidence for a negative effect on businesses. However, previous research
has focused on countries such as Australia (e.g. Wakeﬁeld et al., 2002; Lal et al.,
1Exploiting data on a metabolite of nicotine, Adda and Cornaglia (2006) in a cross state analysis
for the US provide evidence that public smoking bans can increase rather than decrease the exposure
of non-smokers totobacco smoke by displacing smokersto private localities where theycontaminate
non-smokers, in particular children.
42004), Canada (e.g. Stanwick et al., 1988; Luk et al., 2006), and in particular the
United States (e.g. Cowling and Bond, 2005; Adams and Cotti, 2007), where smok-
ing prevalence – and hence also the likely effects on the hospitality industry – is sig-
niﬁcantlylowerthaninmanyEuropeancountries; seethecountryproﬁlesprovided
in (World Health Organization, 2008)2. Yet, as of now, there is still little evidence
for European countries, which only recently enacted public smoking bans. Two
notable exceptions are Adda et al. (2007)3 and Ahlfeldt and Maenning (2009). The
latter study is closely related to the present analysis, as it also focuses on Germany
and uses similar data to ours. However, the scope of the present paper goes beyond
the work of Ahlfeldt and Maenning (2009), as we also consider various exemptions
to state smoking bans, the importance of pre-announced delayed enforcements of
bans, as well as potential effects not just on sales but also on business openings and
start ups.
Furthermore, inadequate data and empirical methods often limit the explanatory
power of existing studies, as subjective (survey-based) rather than objective out-
come measures are used, pre-policy data is not available, or changes in economic
conditions are insufﬁciently controlled for (see Scollo and Lal, 2008). Last but not
least, most non-US analyses focus on the effects of country-wide smoking bans, as
most countries have opted for this type of ban. Country-wide bans, however, pro-
vide variation in government policy only across time. This makes identiﬁcation of
causality difﬁcult, as the effects of such country-wide bans can effectively only be
studied by a before-after type of comparison of outcome measures of interest. In
such a setting, the risk of neglecting potentially confounding time trends is great
(Fleck and Hanssen, 2008), particularly if the period of analysis spans several years.
2Prevalence ﬁgures for Canada are missing in World Health Organization (2008). Yet, Health
Canada reports rather small prevalence rates; see www.hc-sc.gc.ca.
3Estimating the short-run economic impacts of the March 2006 Scottish smoking ban on public
houses, Adda et al. (2007) ﬁnd the ban to have decreased sales by 10 percent and customers by 14
percent.
5In this paper, we investigate whether state-level public smoking bans enacted in
Germany between August 2007 and July 20084 had any discernable adverse effect
on sales in the hospitality industry.5 Following a nation-wide agreement in early
2007 to ban smoking from bars, pubs, restaurants, and discotheques, states enacted
state-speciﬁc regulations at different points in time (see Figure 1 for a time-line of
thesixteenstatebans). Thisstate-levelvariationinthetimingofenactmentofsmok-
ing bans allows us to disentangle genuine effects of tobacco control policies from
potential confounding time-varying factors that might affect sales in the hospitality
industry.
In our analysis, we also exploit the fact that state-level smoking bans varied not
only in their date of enactment, but also in the pre-announced date from which any
violations would be ﬁned (enforcement) by state authorities (see Figure 1), and to
some degree also in their scope and strictness (e.g. permission of separate smoking
rooms in multiple-room establishments; exemptions for small single-room estab-
lishments; exemptions for smokers clubs).6 The differential treatment of small and
large establishments in state smoking ban regulations led to a constitutional com-
plaint of several owners of single-room discotheques and bars, and a ruling of the
Federal Constitutional Court on July 30th 2008 that smoking in single-room busi-
4Ahlfeldt and Maenning (2009) wrongly claim that in January 2008 smoking bans were in opera-
tion in all states and drop the period after this date in major parts of their empirical analysis. In the
state of North Rhine-Westphalia, for instance, the relevant bill (‘Gesetz zur Verbesserung des Nicht-
raucherschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen’) was passed by the state parliament as early as December
19th 2007. However, § 7 of the bill explicitly states that in the hospitality industry smoking bans
come into force only in July 2008. Moreover, as documented in Figure 1, in Rhineland-Palatinate,
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia state smoking bans also were introduced later than January 2008.
5Public perception in Germany at the time and – arguably non-representative – opinion polls
among German innkeepers (CHD Expert, 2008; Kvasnicka and Tauchmann, 2010) strongly conveyed
the impression that smoking bans were harmful to businesses.
6In all states except Bavaria, state smoking ban regulations allowed bars and restaurants to op-
erate separate smoking rooms; in ten of the sixteen German states, state bans also permitted dance
clubs to operate such smoking rooms. In Saarland, as the only state to consider such exemptions,
the state smoking ban – under certain conditions – did not concern small single-room pubs. Certain
exemptions were granted to private clubs in several states. Yet, only in Bavaria and North Rhine-
Westphalia did the relabelling of ordinary pubs to ‘smokers clubs’ develop into a major loophole of
smoking bans.
6Figure 1: Time schedule for the introduction of state smoking bans
nesses is to be allowed7 until December 31st 2009, a deadline by which states must
have revised their legislation. Since then, several states relaxed their regulations,
most notably Bavaria, although its state smoking ban did not conﬂict with the rul-
ing of the federal Constitutional Court. This recent development is not addressed
in our empirical analysis, which is conﬁned to the period from January 2007 to
September 2008 and, hence, focuses only on the short-run effects of the smoke-free
policies that were initially enacted by Germany’s sixteen federal states.
7The court’s decision was directly concerned with the smoke-free legislation of only two states,
i.e. Baden-Wurttemberg and Berlin. Yet, the court implicitly pointed out that its concerns would
analogouslyapplytothesmokingbansinanyotherstate, except–fordifferentreasons–Bavariaand
Saarland. For the latter, state legislation already considered exemptions for small establishments.
In Bavaria smoking rooms were generally not permitted and, hence, single-room pubs were not
discriminated. Moreover, in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, the State Constitutional Court came
to a (provisional) decision similar to the later Federal Constitutional Court’s one as early as February
2008. Thus in this state, smoking bans for small single-room establishments came never into force.
7Our results show that state-level smoking bans in Germany had a negative but
moderate effect on sales in the hospitality industry. Delayed enforcement (ﬁning of
violations) and exemption for single room pubs in some states proved immaterial
for business sales. This does not hold for the option to open smokers clubs. In states
that did allow for such clubs, no adverse effect of smoking bans on sales is found.
We also ﬁnd no evidence that business closures and start-ups were affected by the
introduction of smoking bans. In contrast to the widespread public perception in
Germany at the time and numerous – yet largely non-representative – opinion polls
among German innkeepers (CHD Expert, 2008; Kvasnicka and Tauchmann, 2010),
our results hence suggest that smoking bans, at least in the short run, proved to
be of only moderate harm to businesses. Nevertheless, and in contrast to the bulk
of the (largely US-focused) literature in this area, we do ﬁnd evidence of adverse
effects on businesses’ sales.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section in-
troduces the data, section 3 discusses the empirical approach, and section 4 presents
the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes our main ﬁndings and concludes.
2 The Data
Our empirical analysis is based on data of year-to-year percentage changes8 in
monthly sales at state level. This sales data – hitherto unpublished – was pro-
vided upon request by the German the Federal Statistical Ofﬁce (Statistisches Bun-
desamt).9 It covers the period January 2007 through September 2008 and hence
consists of 336 state-month observations (16 states × 21 months). Information is
8Absolute sales (in e or normalized to a reference date) are also available but judged as less
comparable across time by the data provider (Federal Statistical Ofﬁce) because of state differences
in the sampling design with respect to the handling of panel mortality and the use of refreshment
samples. Our rate of change data accounts for such differences.
9Data provision is gratefully acknowledged.
8available on nominal as well as real sales. Our analysis is based on the latter.10
Sales ﬁgures are available for the entire hospitality industry (industry classiﬁcation
WZ03 Code 55) as well as separately for bars, pubs and discotheques (WZ03 Code
55.4), and restaurants, coffee bars, etc. (WZ03 Code 55.3).
The original establishment-level sample (not available to us), from which state-
level change rates in sales are calculated, consists of roughly 10,000 businesses per
month, a panel randomly sampled from the industry register.11 Sampled estab-
lishments are obliged by law to take part in the survey. Hence, our data does not
suffer from self-selection that is likely to bias results obtained from surveys where
participation is voluntary.12
The sample size substantially varies across states. While about 2,000 establish-
ments are located in North Rhine-Westphalia the corresponding number for Saar-
land is less than 200. Overall, 14 percent of the surveyed establishments belong to
the category ‘bars and pubs’. Thus, if the focus of the analysis were on this category,
the size of the underlying establishment-sample would be rather small, particularly
in smaller federal states. In the following, we conﬁne therefore the analysis to the
entire hospitality industry (WZ03 Code 55).13
2.1 Descriptives
Figure 2 displays average (minimum and maximum) percentage changes in year-
to-year monthly sales for the entire hospitality industry. On average, sales seem to
10Results remain largely unaffected if nominal sales are used instead.
11The industry register only covers establishment whose annual sales exceed 50,000 e.
12In the case of voluntary participation, innkeepers who regard themselves to be detrimentally
affected by tobacco control policies might be more inclined to complain and hence to report – pre-
sumably lower – sales ﬁgures compared to those who do not notice any effect.
13Regressions considering only bars, pubs, and discotheques do not yield any signiﬁcant results.
This is most likely due to the small number of observations that underlie the aggregated state sales
ﬁgures.
9Figure 2: Rates of change in sales across states
decline at an (in absolute terms) slightly increasing rate. However, rates of change
exhibit substantial heterogeneity across states. Figure 3 displays rates of change in
sales using a relative time scale.14 Speciﬁcally, month ‘zero’ represents (is normal-
ized to) the ﬁrst month that a smoking ban has come into force which varies across
states in calendar time. As is evident, Figure 3 does not disclose any visible effect
of state smoking bans on state sales in the hospitality industry.
2.2 Closures and Start Ups
Reporting rates of change in sales rather than absolute sale levels is related to the
Statistical Ofﬁce’s approach to address panel mortality.15 Speciﬁcally, changes in
sales are calculated exclusively for those establishments that have already appeared
14On this relative scale, we only observe ten months simultaneously for all states.
15The hospitality industry is characterized by a rather large rate of market entries and exits, par-
ticularly among bars and pubs.
10Figure 3: Rates of change in sales across states, normalized time scale
in the sample for the corresponding month of the previous year. As a consequence,
our analysis can only detect potential effects on sales of pubs and restaurants that
do survive from one year to the other, that is establishments that do not close down.
To check whether potential closure-driven sample attrition is likely to downward
bias the results of our exclusively sales-based analysis, we analyze data on all mar-
ket entries and exists (closures and start ups) in the hospitality industry using again
ofﬁcial, but different, data from the German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2006-2008a).16 The data contains monthly state-level statistics for the
period January 2006 through September 2008 on the total number of start ups and
closures in the hospitality industry. In the following, we consider only genuine
start ups and closures, that is we ignore events that in a legal but not in an eco-
nomic sense represent market entries and exists, e.g. changes in the legal form of an
establishment.
16Our sales data does not contain information on closure-induced attrition.
11To ease comparability to Figure 3, which documents the evolution of sales on
a relative time scale (normalized to the value of zero in the month a smoking ban
was enacted), Figures 4 and 5 (see Appendix A.1) plot the respective year-to-year
average percentage changes in monthly state closure and start-up rates around the
time state smoking bans were enacted. As is evident, both the series for closures
and start ups exhibit a distinct peak at the time that smoking bans came into force,
that is turnover appears to have increased.
Multivariate econometric analyses, however, ﬁrmly negate this descriptive ﬁnd-
ing. We estimated several models, e.g. linear, log-linear, and count-data, to explain
the number of openings and closures, and employed numerous different speciﬁca-
tions, e.g. one- and two-way ﬁxed effects, and different approaches to parameterize
the potential effect of smoking bans (see Appendix A.2 for some selected results).17
The vast majority of models does not yield any signiﬁcant effect of smoking bans on
either the number of closures or on the number of start ups. Interestingly, however,
there appears to be a positive effect on both start ups and closures if state regu-
lations did allow for smokers clubs. This ﬁnding is most likely explained by the
conversion of existing pubs to smokers clubs that were not identiﬁed as changes in
the legal form.
Of course, effects on genuine closures and start ups might only materialize with
a substantial time lag. Nevertheless, for the short period under investigation in
our sales analysis, the data does not point to any effects on closures or openings
in the hospitality industry and hence does not give any reason to believe that sales
estimates for this period will be severely biased because of sample attrition.
17See the model variants discussed in section 4.
123 The Econometric Speciﬁcation
Consider a log-linear model that links sales ylt in bars, pubs, and restaurants –
aggregated at the state (Bundesland) level – to some exogenous variables xlt:
log(ylt)=β xlt + υlt. (1)
Here l = 1,...,L indicates individual states, t = 1,...,T denotes months, and υlt
represents a random error term. However, in our sales data we do not observe
absolute sales but percentage changes compared to the corresponding month of the
previous year. As log-differences approximate percentage changes, the operational












Thus, any explanatory variable, including those indicators that capture the current
status of smoking ban legislation, enter the regression model in terms of twelve-
months-differences, i.e. xlt − xl(t−12). The constant term, for this reason, captures
a common trend in sales, and state ﬁxed effects capture state-speciﬁc trends rather
than time-invariant state differentials in levels.
Implicitly differencing the regression equation matters for the statistical proper-
ties of the regression model. Even if we assume serially uncorrelated errors, i.e.:
var(υlt)=σ2
l ∀ t and (3)
cov(υlt,υlτ)=0 ∀ τ  = t, (4)
the structure of (2) results in a special case of error-auto-correlation in the opera-






l if τ = t − 12





Equation (1) is formulated in terms of aggregated data. Thus, the errors υlt are
natural candidates for the presence of group (state) wise heteroscedasticity, since
the size of the original samples, from which the aggregated variables are calculated,
varies across the considered states. Group-speciﬁc variances 2σ2
l can be estimated













where L × T − k denotes the degrees of freedom and elt denotes regression residu-
als.18
One may account for the error variance-covariance structure (5) and (6) within
a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) framework. Yet, due to the relatively
small number of observations, FGLS is likely to suffer from small-sample bias and
may perform poorly in practice (e.g. Greene, 2000, 470). Thus, rather than using
FGLS we apply ordinary least squares and correct the estimator’s covariance matrix
according to (5) through (7).19
18Alternatively one may specify the variance as a parametric function of the size Nl of the original
sample from which the state-speciﬁc variables were calculated.
19In oder to check for the robustness of the estimation results, several alternative methods for
calculating standard errors for the OLS estimates where tried along with FGLS for estimation.
144 Results
We start our analysis with a simple unconditional model that – besides the constant
term – explains sales exclusively by a single dummy variable which takes the value
one if a state public smoking ban is in force. As shown in column 1 of Table 1 (mo-
del i), smoking bans in this speciﬁcation exert a signiﬁcant and negative effect on
sales in the hospitality industry.
Next, we add time- and state-speciﬁc effects (model ii), where the latter repre-
sent state-speciﬁc trends in sales. Both groups of dummy variables are highly sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. As the model is already formulated in terms of year-to-year
differences, this two-way ﬁxed effects model extracts quite a lot of variation non-
parametrically, and is hence rather unlikely to incorrectly attribute changes in sales
to smoking bans that originate from unobserved confounding factors. Including
time and state effects does not change our earlier qualitative result. The estimated
magnitude of the adverse effect of smoking bans on sales even increases in abso-
lute terms. However, the point estimate of −1.7 percent is still small and speaks
for a rather moderate effect of public smoking bans. Indeed, taking standard errors
into account, average losses in sales exceeding 3.5 percent can be ruled out at the
0.05-level of signiﬁcance.
These ﬁndings of an adverse but moderate effect clearly do not support the wor-
ries often uttered in the public debate in Germany that smoking bans would be of
serious harm to businesses in the hospitality industry (cf. CHD Expert, 2008). Our
results are roughly in line with descriptive evidence of the Federal Statistical Ofﬁce
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008b), but deviate from those of Ahlfeldt and Maenning
(2009) who do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect on sales in bars and
restaurants. Apart from differences in model speciﬁcation and time period consid-
ered, this divergence in ﬁndings is most likely attributable to the fact that Ahlfeldt
15Table 1: Effects on sales in the hospitality industry (percent)
model variant (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
smoking ban −1.224** −1.685** −1.584** −0.862 −1.924** −2.005** −1.556** −2.251***
(0.624) (0.785) (0.782) (0.811) (0.757) (0.816) (0.789) (0.856)
not enforced – – – −1.779* – – – −0.867
(0.967) (0.968)
month since introduction – – – – 0.364** – – 0.497***
(0.173) (0.183)
smokers clubs permitted – – – – – 4.346*** – 5.278***
(1.267) (1.348)
except for single-room pubs – ––––– −0.559 0.899
(1.134) (1.126)
rainfall – – 0.022** 0.021** 0.020** 0.022** 0.022** 0.019*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
unemployment – – 1.688 1.662 1.763 1.600 1.689 1.670
(1.133) (1.142) (1.138) (1.126) (1.132) (1.132)
constant −2.120*** −1.097 −0.293 −0.670 −0.965 −0.202 −0.354 −1.156
(0.327) (0.969) (2.030) (2.035) (2.032) (2.014) (2.041) (2.014)
time-ﬁxed-effects no yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
state-ﬁxed-effects no yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
number of observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
degrees of freedom 334 299 297 296 296 296 296 293
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%; standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for group-wise
heteroscedasticity and year-to-year auto-correlation.
and Maenning (2009) apparently misspecify the dates for several states at which
state smoking bans came into force (see footnote 4 above).
Our ﬁnding of a negative effect of smoking bans on sales is also robust to the
inclusion of additional controls, such as state unemployment rates and weather
conditions in the individual states (temperature and rainfall), which might affect
state sales in the hospitality industry (model iii). Here, the coefﬁcient attached to
the monthly unemployment rate is positive, yet never signiﬁcant. Temperature (ex-
cluded from the reported speciﬁcations) does not exert any signiﬁcant effect on
sales. In contrast, rain does matter and bears the expected positive sign. That is,
people spend more money – and presumably more time – in bars pubs and restau-
rants if the weather is bad. One additional liter in rainfall per square-meter and
month results in an increase in sales of 0.02 percent. This appears to be a rather
moderate effect compared to average monthly rainfall, e.g. 48 l/m2 in Berlin. Yet,
it is still remarkable that the effect of rainfall on sales can such clearly be detected
16even in aggregated data. Moreover, the positive effect of rainfall turns out to be
very robust to various speciﬁcations of the regression model.
Smoking ban regulations varied in content across states and time (see section 1).
To capture any potential effects of such variations, we augmented the model with
several indicators that enter the regression as interaction terms with the smoking
ban dummy. First (model iv), we examine whether smoking bans per se matter,
or whether enforcement, i.e. ﬁnes in the case of infringement against these bans, is
what really matters. Here, the model includes a dummy indicating that infringe-
ments against smoking bans are generally not ﬁned (see Figure 1 for the states and
months without enforcement). The relevant coefﬁcient’s estimate is somewhat puz-
zling. The interaction term – though just marginally signiﬁcant – is negative, indi-
cating that bans exert a stronger adverse effect on sales if not enforced. Moreover, in
this speciﬁcation, the estimated base-line effect becomes statistically insigniﬁcant.
Jointly, however, both coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant. This result might be explained by
the ‘non enforced’ dummy capturing an effect of the recent introduction of a ban
rather than its genuine enforcement. For any state that allowed for a period with-
out ﬁnes, this period only covers a few months following the introduction of a state
smoking ban.
To check for this, model (v) includes the number of months for which a smoking
ban has been in force. As it turns out, the estimated coefﬁcient is indeed positive
and signiﬁcant, indicating that smoking bans had particularly strong effects imme-
diately after their introduction. If both the ‘no enforcement’ indicator and ‘time
since introduction’ are included in the regression, the former becomes insigniﬁ-
cant, which supports our earlier reasoning. Yet, the role enforcement plays remains
somewhat unclear. A signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient of ‘time since introduction’
is, however, relevant in its own right. It indicates that the instantaneous effect on
17sales fades out as smoking bans are in effect for a longer period of time.20 Smok-
ers might be strongly disgruntled by smoking bans at ﬁrst, and reduce their going
out accordingly. As time proceeds, however, they may adapt and return to their
previous going-out habits.
We also examined the role that ‘smokers clubs’ played for the impact of bans on
sales. Speciﬁcally, weincludedanotherinteractionthattakesthevalueofoneonlyif
pubs and bars in a state could avoid becoming smoke free by converting themselves
to a smokers club (model vi). This option did exist for establishments located in the
states of Bavaria und North Rhine-Westfalia.21 The estimated coefﬁcients exhibit
the expected pattern. While the base effect of smoking bans is still negative and sig-
niﬁcant – in absolute terms it even takes a larger value – the interaction term bears
a positive sign. In absolute terms, its size even exceeds the size of the estimated
base effect. Hence, a negative effect on sales is only found for those states that did
not permit smokers clubs. The point estimates even argue for increasing sales in
Bavaria und North Rhine-Westfalia after smoking bans – that permit smokers clubs
– have been introduced. Yet, in statistical terms, this ﬁnding is not signiﬁcant at the
0.05-level.
Finally, we analyzed the effect of exemptions for small single-room pubs (model
vii). In the states of Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, such exemptions existed
as soon as state bans were introduced. For any other state – except Bavaria – the
Federal Constitutional Court virtually introduced such exemptions late in July 2008
(see section 1 for details). Yet, the corresponding coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant and the
20Given the rather short period of time considered and the limited number of observations for
which bans have in been force for a substantial number of months, interpreting the estimated co-
efﬁcient as a parametric time trend that allows for forecasting future effects does not make much
sense.
21Several other state bans also considered certain exemptions for private clubs. Yet, these exemp-
tions did not develop into a major loophole as simply relabelling ordinary pubs to smokers clubs
was no option.
18estimated base effect differs just marginally from our reference speciﬁcation (model
ii). Hence, we do ﬁnd evidence for an effect of single-room pubs being exempted
from smoking bans. This might be due to the fact that the relevant court ruling
concerned the majority of states from the same point in time, which renders the
identiﬁcation of such an effect difﬁcult.
If all four aforementioned interaction terms are simultaneously considered (mo-
del viii), we get a similar picture to that where we included these regressors in-
dividually. That is, the base effect of smoking bans is negativ and signiﬁcant. The
estimatedcoefﬁcientsfor‘timesinceintroduction’and‘smokersclubs’arebothpos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant, while those for ‘no enforcement’ and exemptions
for single-room pubs are insigniﬁcant.
In sum, our analysis suggests that smoking bans have harmed sales in the hospi-
tality industry in Germany. In qualitative terms, this result is robust to wide range
of variations to the model. As our empirical approach accounts for level-effects
by considering year-to-year differences and in addition considers time-effects and
state-speciﬁc trends, it is rather unlikely that unobserved heterogeneity drives our
key result. In quantitative terms, the (maximum) point estimate indicates losses in
sales of 2.3 percent with a corresponding (standard-error based) upper bound of
3.7 percent. Hence, the estimated effect is rather moderate. Yet, one has to keep in
mind that this result represent an average effect across the entire hospitality indus-
try. At the individual establishment level, losses in sales are likely to vary across
establishments. Moreover, very small establishments, which often are assumed to
be hit particularly hard by smoking bans, are not considered in the data. Hence,
certain individual – and supposedly certain groups of – establishments might have
suffered substantially larger decreases in sales than indicated by our estimates.
195 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied whether state-level smoking bans in Germany affected
sales in the German hospitality industry in the short run. Identiﬁcation of such
effects rests on the fact that German states introduced smoking bans at different
points in time within the period from August 2007 to July 2008. Our analysis hence
does not rely on a simple before-after comparison, but exploits intra-country re-
gional variation in regulations. Regression analyses yielded a statistically signif-
icant and negative average effect on sales of roughly two percent. This result is
robust to a wide range of model speciﬁcations and to the inclusion of state- and
time-speciﬁc level effects as well as state-speciﬁc trends in sales. There is some
evidence, however, that adverse effects do fade out if smoking bans have been in
force for some time. Our key ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant and adverse effect of smoking
bans on sales in the hospitality industry stands in contrast to the main body of the
existing – largely US-based – literature, which in the majority does not ﬁnd such
an effect. One may explain this discrepancy by the fact that smoking prevalence is
much smaller in the US than in Germany, which limits the magnitude of any ad-
verse effect that smoking bans may exert on business sales. Although our results
show that innkeepers were harmed by smoking bans, this does not render such
bans unjustiﬁed. Rather, it contributes another piece of evidence for an objective
overall comparison of the costs and beneﬁts of anti-smoking regulation.
20A Appendix
A.1 Descriptive analysis of closures and start ups
Figure 4: Rate of change in business closures, normalized time scale
Figure 5: Rate of change in business openings, normalized time scale
21A.2 Econometric analysis of closures and start ups
Table 2: Effects on the number of business closures (OLS regression)
speciﬁcation (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
smoking ban −3.096 −7.627 −2.936 −13.477 −8.904 −6.716 −11.668
(20.699) (9.052) (9.706) (8.766) (9.170) (9.225) (10.910)
not enforced – – −12.299** – – – −7.532
(5.136) (4.848)
month since introduction – – – 2.562* – – 2.638*
(1.417) (1.293)
smokers clubs permitted – – – – 16.486*** – 18.162**
(3.964) (6.506)
except for single-room pubs – – – – – −15.252 −8.653
(9.554) (8.945)
constant 254.577*** 290.938*** 290.938*** 290.938*** 290.938*** 290.938*** 290.938***
(10.060) (12.167) (12.316) (12.171) (12.287) (12.185) (12.414)
time-ﬁxed-effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
state-ﬁxed-effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
number of observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 528
degrees of freedom 526 479 478 478 478 478 475
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%; absolute number of closures at the left-hand-side;
months from January 2006 to September 2008 considered; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3: Effects on the number of start ups (OLS regression)
speciﬁcation (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
smoking ban −11.415 −8.593 −5.537 −9.443 −9.440 −8.438 −7.860
(16.109) (8.023) (9.075) (9.052) (7.765) (8.069) (11.153)
not enforced – – −8.012 – – – −6.467
(5.006) (5.501)
month since introduction – – – 0.372 – – 0.420
(1.583) (1.920)
smokers clubs permitted – – – – 10.930*** – 10.222
(2.803) (7.474)
except for single-room pubs – – – – – −2.586 −0.291
(6.821) (7.696)
constant 208.545*** 215.125*** 215.125*** 215.125*** 215.125*** 215.125*** 215.125***
(10.060) (6.332) (6.371) (6.340) (6.380) (6.337) (6.424)
time-ﬁxed-effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
state-ﬁxed-effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
number of observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 528
degrees of freedom 526 479 478 478 478 478 475
Notes: *** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%; absolute number of start ups at the left-hand-side;
months from January 2006 to September 2008 considered; robust standard errors in parentheses.
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